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Superdumb Discrimination in Superfund:
CERCLA Section 107 Violates
Equal Protection
Dashiell Shapirot
Twenty years ago, Congress enacted Superfund, or the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), to make polluters pay for cleanup at hazardous
waste sites.' In many respects, the law has succeeded: CERCLA
drastically reduced industry-generated hazardous waste and
"spawned a hugely successful and innovative environmental
cleanup industry."' Nevertheless, many view the law as a com-
plete failure,' citing its unfair liability scheme,4 its poor drafting,'
A.B. 2000, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2003, 'University of Chicago.
1 42 USC §§ 9601-75 (1995).
2 See Thomas S. Udall, Superfund: The Keynote Address at the 20th Annual Ad-
vanced American Law Institute-American Bar Association Course of Study on Hazardous
Wastes, Superfund, and Toxic Substances, 29 Envir L Rptr 10143, 10145 (1999) (arguing
that CERCLA has been a success and outlining why CERCLA critics are mistaken).
3 See United States v A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc, 854 F Supp 229, 239 (S D
NY 1994) ("CERCLA is now viewed nearly universally as a failure."); 140 Cong Rec E602
(March 24, 1994) (statement of William H. Zeliff introducing the Superfund Improvement
Act of 1994) ("It is time for Congress to admit they made mistakes in Superfund law ... a
law that has gone awry.").
4 See John C. Butler, et al, Rethinking Superfund: It Costs Too Much, It's Unfair, It
Must Be Fixed; Superfund Reform Act of 1994, HR Rep No 103-582 Pt 1, 103d Cong, 2d
Sess 76-77 (1994) (listing the six broad categories of criticisms, including high transaction
costs stemming from excessive litigation).
' CERCLA was rushed through the House right before Ronald Reagan took office.
See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 Wm & Mary L Rev 1405, 1405-06
(1997) (discussing CERCLA's poor drafting, ambiguities, vague provisions, and policy
errors). One Senator noted that "[o]nly the frailest, moment-to-moment coalition" led to its
passage and that "it would now be impossible to pass the bill again, even unchanged." See
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, A Legislative History of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 774 (GPO
1983) (letter from Robert Stafford and Jennings Randolph to James Florio, December 2,
1980).
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the excessive legal fees it has generated,6 and the large number of
contaminated sites that have yet to be cleaned up.
Most criticism of CERCLA focuses on its liability scheme,
although courts have resisted constitutional challenges to this
aspect of the statute.8 Because CERCLA imposes liability on pol-
luters retroactively, and jointly-and-severally, a company that
contributed only a small percentage of hazardous waste to a site
in a way that was perfectly legal before CERCLA's enactment
now could be forced to pay staggering cleanup costs.' These
cleanup costs at hazardous waste sites average thirty million dol-
lars per site'° and approximately 77.5 percent of CERCLA reme-
diation costs can be attributed to waste disposed prior to
CERCLA's passage in 1981.1 Even courts that have recognized
the unfairness of retroactive and joint-and-several liability have
rejected constitutional challenges to CERCLA's liability scheme,
noting its rational relation to a legitimate government interest:
making polluters pay for cleanup at hazardous waste sites."Courts have rejected challenges to CERCLA's liability scheme
6 See Message to the Congress on Environmental Policy, 31 Weekly Comp Pres Doc
558, 559 (Apr 6, 1995) (quoting then President Clinton, saying that "[flor far too long, far
too many Superfund dollars have been spent on lawyers and not nearly enough have been
spent on clean-up").
' See Karen S. Danahy, CERCLA Retroactive Liability in the Aftermath of Eastern
Enterprises v Apfel, 48 Buff L Rev 509, 561 n 359 (2000) (noting that only 497 hazardous
waste sites have been cleaned up, and 40,000 remain), citing David K Aylward, Super-
fund Reauthorization Issues in the 106th Congress, Cong Res Serv 5-6 (Dec 13, 1999).
8 See, for example, United States v Maryland Sand, Gravel & Stone Co, 39 Envir
Rptr (BNA) 1761, 1774 (D Md 1994) (holding that, because of CERCLA's joint and several
liability scheme, the EPA's exclusion of certain parties from CERCLA settlement negotia-
tions does not violate equal protection); United States v Conservation Chemical Co, 619 F
Supp 162, 214-15 (W D Mo 1985) (rejecting the claim that CERCLA's joint and several
liability violates the Equal Protection Clause).
See Daniel E. Troy, Retroactive Legislation 85 (American Enterprise Institute 1997)
(questioning the prevailing judicial conclusions that the enacting Congress intended
CERCLA to apply retroactively and that such retroactive application is constitutional).
But see Conservation Chemical, 619 F Supp at 217-222 (holding that CERCLA's retroac-
tivity is constitutional).
10 Thomas W. Church and Robert T. Nakamura, Cleaning Up The Mess: Implementa-
tion Strategies in Superfund 8 (Brookings 1993).
" See Superfund Program Hearings on HR 3800 before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 441 (1994) (statement of Katherine N. Probst, Research
Fellow in the Center for Risk Management at Resources for the Future).
12 See, for example, United States v Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co,
810 F2d 726, 733 (8th Cir 1986) (finding parties liable for CERCLA cleanup costs incurred
prior to CERCLA's enactment).
SUPERDUMB DISCRIMINATION IN SUPERFUND
under the Due Process Clause,3 the Takings Clause, 4 and the Ex
Post Facto Clause.5
A more problematic inequality in CERCLA, and one that par-
ties have yet to challenge on constitutional grounds, is the stat-
ute's discrimination against private cost recovery actions in Sec-
tion 107.6 In theory, CERCLA cost recovery actions enable gov-
ernmental and private parties that have cleaned up contami-
nated sites to sue to collect the cleanup costs from the responsible
parties. Thus, cost recovery actions ought to serve CERCLA's
twin goals of encouraging cleanup and making polluters pay.18
Unfortunately, while Section 107 allows the government to collect
its attorneys' fees from responsible parties, private parties cannot
recover attorneys' fees. 9 This disparity is particularly vulnerable
to constitutional challenge because, unlike CERCLA's liability
scheme which promotes the "polluter pays" principle, CERCLA's
ban on private attorneys' fees benefits polluters and punishes
parties who perform the cleanups.
CERCLA Section 107 makes the party responsible for the
hazardous waste contamination jointly and severally liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingencyplan.20
This restriction on a private party's recoverable costs thwarts
CERCLA's twin goals of encouraging private cleanup and making
See id at 733. See also Conservation Chemical, 619 F Supp at 217-222.
14 Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F2d at 734.
is See, for example, United States v Amtreco, Inc, 809 F Supp 959, 970 (M D Ga 1993).
16 See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4) (creating procedural and substantive barriers to private
cost recovery actions but not for governmental cost recovery actions).
' See id.
18 See, for example, Control Data Corp v SCSC Corp, 53 F3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir
1995) (noting that CERCLA is designed to encourage timely cleanup and place responsibil-
ity on the parties that caused the contamination).
19 42 USC § 9607(a)(4) (establishing that private parties may only recover necessary
cleanup costs); Key Tronic Corp v United States, 511 US 809, 819-20 (1994) (ruling that
attorneys' fees related to litigation are not part of the "necessary costs" that private par-
ties may recover); United States v Chapman, 146 F3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir 1998) (holding
that the government may recover attorneys' fees). Private parties may recover attorney's
fees for cleanup expenses, but not for cost recovery actions.
20 42 USC § 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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responsible parties pay." The EPA cannot clean up all or even
most of the hazardous waste sites in the country, and it relies on
private parties to conduct over seventy percent of CERCLA
cleanups." Because cleanup costs and especially attorneys' fees
are staggering for an average cleanup, the current scheme gives
private parties a strong incentive to wait for the government to
force them to act." As noted above, CERCLA cleanups cost thirty
million dollars on average," of which around half is spent on at-
torneys' fees. A private party faced with the possibility of recov-
ering only fifteen million dollars on a thirty million dollar recov-
ery is likely to forgo cleanup altogether and wait for the EPA to
force it to act."
Section 107's ban on private party attorneys' fees recovery
has contributed to the statute's widely-noted failure to bring
about private cleanup.7 An estimated forty thousand hazardous
21 See Control Data Corp, 53 F3d at 935-36 (stating CERCLA's twin aims).
22 See HR Rep No 105-582 Pt 1, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 76-77 (1994).
23 See Kenneth F. Rossman IV, Case Note, Key Tronic Corp v United States: Ratify-
ing an Inequitable Distribution of Private Party Costs Under Superfund By Refusing to
Shift Attorneys' Fees, 4 Geo Mason U L Rev 113, 132-33 (arguing that Congress should
legislatively reverse Key Tronic).
24 See id at 113 n 8, citing Mark Reisch, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief
94-016 Superfund Reauthorization Issues in the 103d Congress 2 (1994) (noting that the
average cleanup costs thirty million dollars).
'5 See Kimberly Leue, Private Party Settlements in the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 8 Stan Envir L J 131, 135 n 21 (1989) (citing studies that
litigation/transaction costs consume 55 percent of cleanup expenditures). There is some
dispute about the actual percentage of cleanup costs that are spent on litigation:
Transaction costs. One of the most obvious collateral effects of Superfund
is the creation of massive transaction costs, especially in the private sec-
tor. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice recently reported aggregate
transaction cost data for five fortune 100 companies of 21 percent for all
toxic waste sites between 1986 and 1989, but between 30 and 40 percent
at multiparty sites. The National Paint and Coatings Association survey
of its members, mostly smaller businesses, reported average transaction
costs of 77 percent. And this does not include the nearly $500 million a
year RAND found that insurers were spending on Superfund, nearly half
of which was spent to defend PRP's in their disputes with EPA. Any way
you look at it then, diversion of corporate resources to fundamentally un-
productive activity related to Superfund liability are high, especially for a
country already facing competitive challenges from abroad.
Congressional Record - Extension of Remarks, 138 Cong Rec E 3328, 102d Cong, 2d Sess
(Oct 29, 1992) (statement of Representative Tauzin).
26 See Rossman, Case Note, 4 Geo Mason U L Rev at 132-33 (cited in note 23).
27 See Barry L. Johnson and Christopher T. DeRosa, The Toxicological Hazard of
Superfund Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 Rev on Environ Health 235, 236 (1997) (concluding
that the high percentage of CERCLA sites containing high levels of toxic substances are a
major human health threat) (citations omitted).
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waste sites have been reported to various federal agencies.28 In
addition, there are more than one thousand sites on the Super-
fund National Priorities List ("NPL") that have yet to be cleaned
up.' The EPA puts sites on the NPL when it determines that they
"pose the greatest threat to the public's health and the environ-
ment. ' The magnitude of the cleanups that must be completed
creates a pressing need to provide private plaintiffs the same
ability as governmental plaintiffs to recover their attorneys' fees
when they bring cost recovery actions.31
The Supreme Court has rejected a statutory interpretation of
CERCLA that would level the playing field between governmen-
tal and private cost recovery actions." Courts, however, have yet
to hear an equal protection challenge to Section 107's discrimina-
tion against private plaintiffs. This Comment argues that the
current disparity in Section 107 cost recovery actions violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as ap-
plied to the federal government through the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which requires that laws discriminating
against similarly situated parties be rationally related to a le-
gitimate government interest.3 A Fifth Amendment equal protec-
tion challenge to CERCLA, a statute that involves no fundamen-
tal right and employs no suspect classification such as race, must
show that Section 107 lacks a rational basis for treating similarly
situated parties differently.4
As no case law or scholarship addresses this question, this
Comment constructs an equal protection challenge to Section 107
2 See id.
29 See Danahy, 48 Buff L Rev at 561 n 359 (cited in note 7), citing Aylward, Superfund
Reauthorization Issues in the 106th Congress at 5-6 (finding only 201 sites have been
deleted from the NPL after nineteen years of CERCLA); see also Rossman, Case Note, 4
Geo Mason U L Rev at 132 n 139 (cited in note 23), citing Reisch, Superfund Reauthoriza-
tion Issues at 8 (cited in note 24) (finding that fourteen years after the enactment of
CERCLA, cleanup has been completed a fewer than 20 percent of the sites placed on the
NPL).
30 Johnson and DeRosa, 12 Rev on Environ Health at 236 (cited in note 27).
31 See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 Geo Wash L Rev 1043, 1132-33 (1994)
(arguing, prior to the Key Tronic decision, that barring private parties from recovering
attorneys' fees will discourage parties from settling, leading to delay in remediation of
contaminated sites and wasteful litigation over response costs).
32 See Key Tronic, 511 US at 819-20 (rejecting a statutory construction challenge to
Section 107's bar on private plaintiff attorneys' fees).
33 See Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 319-20 (1993) (describing rational basis review).
34 See id (describing rational basis review and holding that a Kentucky statute allow-
ing lower standard of proof in mental retardation committee hearings than in mental
illness commitment hearings is subject to rational basis review).
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using analogous case law and policy analysis. Part I confronts
potential problems in applying equal protection analysis to laws
that discriminate between the government and private parties.
Part II demonstrates why governmental and private parties are
similarly situated in Section 107 cost recovery actions. Part III
establishes that courts will analyze an equal protection challenge
to Section 107 under the rational basis standard, and discusses
different ways courts apply this standard. Finally, Part IV uses
analogous federal cases from recent challenges to the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act ("PLRA") to show that Section 107's ban on
private plaintiff attorneys' fees recovery violates equal protection.
I. APPLYING EQUAL PROTECTION TO SIMILARLY SITUATED
GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE PARTIES
Private plaintiffs seeking to challenge Section 107 face an
initial hurdle: whether courts should analyze discrimination
among governmental and private parties using equal protection
analysis. Indeed, some cases specifically hold that because the
federal government is not a "person" under the Equal Protection
Clause, equal protection analysis is not the correct standard to
judge laws that discriminate between governmental and private
parties." The essential requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which extend to the fed-
eral government through the Fifth Amendment,3' establish that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws. If the government is
not a "person," Section 107's discrimination against private par-
ties may not raise a constitutional question. This section evalu-
ates several possible arguments private CERCLA parties can
make to avoid the "personhood" issue and convince a court to hear
an equal protection challenge to Section 107.
Part A presents cases that hold that the government is not a
constitutional "person." These cases could bar a challenge to Sec-
tion 107 because, if the government is not a "person" for equal
protection purposes, the law's discrimination amongst govern-
mental and private parties may not raise a constitutional ques-
31 See, for example, United States v Nebo, 90 F Supp 73, 95-96 (W D La 1950).
3 See Boling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that racially segregated
schools in the District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment).
3' US Const Amend XIV (emphasis added).
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tion. Part B notes that Congress defined the government as a
"person" in drafting CERCLA, and argues that this fact may al-
low a plaintiff to challenge Section 107 on equal protection
grounds. Part C argues that, even if the government is not a "per-
son," courts should still hear equal protection challenges to
CERCLA brought by private parties, because they are persons.
Finally, Part D argues that even if the "personhood" issue pre-
vents private CERCLA plaintiffs from challenging Section 107 on
equal protection grounds, it would not prevent CERCLA defen-
dants from doing so.
A. The Government is Usually Not Considered a Constitutional
"Person"
1. United States v Nebo Oil Co.
In United States v Nebo Oil Co,38 a Louisiana district court
case from 1950, the court held that the federal government is not
a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Although not the
first or last case to decide this question," Nebo thoroughly ex-
plained its reasoning and therefore provides an important intro-
duction to the issue of the government's "personhood" under the
Constitution.4 In Nebo, the United States challenged Louisiana
Act No. 315 of 1940 ("the Act"), which negatively affected its prop-
erty rights.
41
Notably, the United States argued that the Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
court rejected this argument, however, holding that the United
90 F Supp 73 (W D La 1950).
' Id at 95.
40 See, for example, Wisconsin v Zimmerman, 205 F Supp 673, 675 (W D Wis 1962
(holding that the government is not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment); Scott v
Frazier, 258 F 669, 671 (N D SD 1919), revd on other grounds at 253 US 243, 244 (1920)
(same).
41 See Nebo, 90 F Supp at 95-96.
42 Id at 84. The law in question, Act. No. 315 of 1940, provided that when the United
States bought land subject to prior mineral rights, those rights were imprescriptible. Id at
79. The United States made a number of preliminary constitutional arguments, beginning
with the claim that the Act violated Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which prohibits dis-
crimination against government property. Id at 94-95. The court held that the United
States's interest in the property was so speculative that the issue did not rise to a consti-
tutional question. Nebo, 90 F Supp at 84-85. The court also held that the Act did not vio-
late the Contract Clause because it merely supported parties understanding of their con-
tract obligations and a statute of prescription is not part of a contract and can be amended
without impairing contractual obligations. Id at 94-95.
4 Id at 95.
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States is not a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and is not "within the jurisdiction" of Louisiana as
that phrase is used in the Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, the
United States lacked standing to sue under the Equal Protection
Clause.' The court based its decision on legislative intent, stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect individ-
ual "persons" because it was adopted at the close of the Civil War
for the specific purpose of "guaranteeing Negroes their freedom."'
Also, because the United States challenged a Louisiana law, the
Nebo court noted that it would be "inconceivable" that Congress
and the states would seek to regulate the delicate balance of fed-
eralism through "muffled words and inept phrases" defining the
government as a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Even if the government were a person for the constitutional
analysis, the Nebo court would have found its equal protection
argument unconvincing. 8 The court found a rational basis for the
Act's classifications that disadvantaged the United States, be-
cause there was "an obvious difference between the sovereign and
a private person or corporation" and the state had a legitimate
interest in preventing the United States from withdrawing land
from commerce for long periods of time.'
2. South Carolina v Katzenbach.
In addition to the district court opinion in Nebo, which held
that the federal government is not a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled in South Carolina v
Katzenbach"° that a state is not a "person" under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." The Court used this holding to
reject South Carolina's claim that the Voting Rights Act of 1965
impaired its due process rights through provisions limiting judi-
4 Id.
45 Nebo, 90 F Supp at 95.
46 Id at 96.
47 Id.
48 See id at 97 ("Even if the Act fell within the literal wording of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, it would nevertheless be valid on the ground that it is a reasonable
classification.").
49 See Nebo, 90 F Supp at 99-100.
"0 383 US 301 (1966).
61 Id at 323-24 ("The word 'person' in the context of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to en-
compass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any
court.") (citations omitted).
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cial review and violating the separation of powers doctrine. 2
Katzenbach does not address equal protection or whether the fed-
eral government is a constitutional "person", so its analysis may
not apply in an equal protection challenge to Section 107.n Never-
theless, Katzenbach's hostility towards affording constitutional
personhood to a state suggests that the Supreme Court accepts
Nebo's exclusion of sovereign entities from the class of "persons"
protected by the Constitution.54
B. CERCLA Defines the Government as a "Person"
By defining the government as a constitutional non-person,
Nebo and Katzenbach may preclude an equal protection challenge
to Section 107. CERCLA, however, defines "person" as "an indi-
vidual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State,
or any interstate body."' Thus, CERCLA shows clear congres-
sional intent to treat both governmental and private parties as
"persons."
CERCLA's definition of governmental entities as "persons"
may allow a court to apply equal protection analysis to Section
107's discrimination amongst governmental and private parties.
Nebo and Katzenbach did not involve statutes that defined the
government as a "person." The courts in those cases had no statu-
tory text to look to for guidance on the personhood issue, and in-
stead relied on the traditional notion the government is not a
"person" under the constitution.6 These cases may have come out
differently if the challenged statute defined both governmental
and private entities as "persons."' Perhaps by passing a law like
CERCLA that defines the government as a "person," Congress
52 Id at 323. The Court rejected a Fifth Amendment analysis of the Voting Rights Act,
reasoning that the Fifteenth Amendment granted Congress clear authority to pass such
legislation. Id at 325-26.
See Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607, 619 (1992) (holding that
Argentina possessed "minimum contacts" with the United States based on its commercial
activity and, citing Katzenbach, "[aissuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is a
'person' for purposes of the Due Process Clause") (emphasis added).
64 See Katzenbach, 383 US at 325-26.
56 42 USC § 9601(21) (emphasis added).
' See Nebo, 90 F Supp at 95-100; Katzenbach, 383 US at 325-26.
61 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L J 1535, 1599-1602 (2000)
(noting that a Congressional statute overturning established constitutional jurisprudence
could be upheld, although it probably would not be by the current Court).
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can waive the government's traditional non-personhood just as it
can waive federal sovereign immunity, as CERCLA also does.'
Academics have questioned whether Congress can override a
court decision on constitutional personhood in the controversial
context of abortion rights, and the issue is far from settled. In Roe
v Wade," the Supreme Court held that "the word 'person,' as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."'
Roe, however, did not state whether Congress could overturn the
Court's decision by enacting a law defining a fetus as a "person,"
although the Court has since provided some guidance on this is-
sue with its decision in City of Boerne v Flores.6' Flores, which
held that Congress may not, pursuant to its powers under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rewrite the substantive guaran-
tees of the Constitution," probably bars Congress from overturn-
ing Roe by statute, although this is not a settled question.' If
Congress may not overturn Roe by defining a fetus as a "person,"
they probably may not overturn cases like Nebo and Katzenbach
by defining the government as a "person," as CERCLA does."
It is nevertheless worth considering the argument because it
is not well established that private parties may not assert an
equal protection violation when a law discriminates in favor of
the federal government in the unique situations such as CERCLA
where the federal and private parties are similarly situated.6
While a court may not appreciate a Congressional attempt to
overturn Roe's constitutional interpretation, it is much more
likely to defer to Congress's "person" definition in CERCLA ab-
sent a controlling judicial decision.' Neither Nebo nor Katzenbach
'a See id at 1599. One could also propose that CERCLA merely invites the court to
revisit its prior rulings on the personhood of governmental entities. See Stephen L. Carter,
The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U Chi
L Rev 819, 824 (1986) (arguing that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be
"understood as a tool that permits the Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legisla-
tion to engage the Court in a dialogue about our fundamental rights, thereby 'forcing' the
Justices to take a fresh look at their own judgments").
59 410 US 113 (1973).
" Id at 158.
61 521 US 507 (1997).
62 Id at 519-20.
3 See note 58.
6 See id.
" See Section III C.
See Roger Clegg, Is a Ban on Partial-Birth Abortions Within Congress's Enumer-
ated Powers? 3 Nexus J Op 25, 30 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court could allow a
ban on partial-birth abortions without contradicting Flores, because the "personhood" of
the fetus at this stage was not completely resolved in Roe).
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directly address whether the federal government is a "person"
under the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and nei-
ther case addresses whether the government is a "person" when it
brings a cost recovery action just like any other private CERCLA
plaintiff. In Flores, the Court rebuffed Congress's attempt to
overturn Employment Division v Smith7 by passing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.68 The Flores Court noted that, "[ilt is for
Congress in the first instance to 'determine whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much defer-
ence."' Even though Congress may not have intended to define
the government as a constitutional "person" in drafting CERCLA,
the statute appears to be a "first instance" case where the Court
may permit Congress to state who is a "person" and who is not.
Therefore, a private party asserting an equal protection challenge
to Section 107 is more likely to overcome the personhood hurdle
than a plaintiff expecting to overturn Roe with a Congressional
statute defining fetuses as "persons."'
C. The Government's "Personhood" Should Be Irrelevant
A more persuasive argument in favor of applying equal pro-
tection analysis to Section 107 is that, since the violation is raised
by a private plaintiff, the government's personhood should not be
at issue. Unlike Nebo, where the court held that the federal gov-
ernment did not have standing to raise an equal protection viola-
tion because it was not a "person," a private cost recovery plaintiff
challenging CERCLA is without question a constitutional "per-
son."7' So far, equal protection case law has not adequately ad-
dressed whether all of the similarly situated parties in an equal
protection analysis must be "persons," or whether only those as-
serting the equal protection violation must be.
67 494 US 872 (1990).
Flores, 521 US at 515, citing Katzenbach, 384 US at 651.
69 521 US at 536.
70 See note 57.
71 See Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co, 118 US 394, 396 (1886)
("The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a state to deny to any person
the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it
does.").
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1. Pan Am Health Organization v Montgomery County: all
parties must be "persons" in equal protection analyses.
One district court has, in dicta, rejected the notion that a law
could violate equal protection by discriminating against a "per-
son" in favor of a "non-person" governmental entity. In Pan
American Health Organization v Montgomery County,"2 the dis-
trict court in Maryland noted that the plaintiff health Organiza-
tion (PAHO) could not assert an equal protection violation, rea-
soning in a footnote that:
Although not directly raised by the parties, it occurs to the
undersigned that it may indeed be inappropriate for
PAHO to contend that it has the right to be treated
equally to the State of Maryland, a non-person for pur-
poses of equal protection or to the United States, which is
accorded supremacy. One would logically assume that the
comparators for equal protection purposes ought all be
"persons" subject to equal protection analysis."2
The court, however, did not mention any justification for its "logi-
cal" assumption. Furthermore, the court's dicta conflicts with the
decisions of two other courts that have analyzed equal protection
challenges, brought by private parties, to laws like CERCLA that
discriminate against private and governmental parties.
2. United States v Williams: equal protection analysis of
private and public gambling.
The Third Circuit, in United States v Williams," recently em-
ployed an equal protection analysis to a statute that discrimi-
nated against private gambling.7 Williams, a criminal defendant
convicted for racketeering under a Pennsylvania statute that
made private gambling illegal, brought a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim challenging his conviction on the grounds
that the racketeering statute violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection.' He argued that the statute
permitted some forms of gambling, such as the state lottery,
72 889 F Supp 234 (D Md 1994).
7 Id at 240 n 7.
74 124 F3d 411 (3d Cir 1997).
71 Id at 421-22.
76 Id.
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while prohibiting similar gambling organized by private parties."
The court accepted his characterization of the constitutional
question, and analyzed the statute on rational basis grounds, ig-
noring the issue of whether the state is a person under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.8 The court even-
tually found a rational basis for the statute, reasoning that it was
designed to regulate the undesirable effects of organized crime
which was largely associated with private gambling, and thus did
not violate equal protection. 9
3. South Louisiana Grain Services, Inc v Bergland: equal
protection analysis of private and public grain inspection.
In a case presenting issues more analogous to those pre-
sented in the CERCLA context, South Louisiana Grain Services,
Inc v Bergland,'o the D.C. Circuit analyzed the United States
Grain Standards Act of 1976 ("the GSA") on equal protection
grounds.8' Prior to 1976, private agencies had performed most
grain regulation.82 Because of rampant corruption, Congress en-
acted the GSA to replace the private system with a public inspec-
tion regime." South Louisiana Grain Services, a private grain
inspection organization, argued that the law violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because it "unreasonably dis-
criminated against private inspection agencies while permitting
some Service-approved state agencies to continue to conduct offi-
cial inspections. '" The court analyzed this claim on rational basis
grounds, and ultimately rejected it, finding that Congress acted
reasonably in replacing corrupt private regulators with a public
system.85
Bergland is probably the best case to show that Section 107
should be evaluated under the equal protection clause. Both the
GSA analyzed in Bergland and Section 107 discriminate against
private parties who perform a quasi-regulatory function, and in
favor of governmental entities. In Bergland, the GSA replaced
private regulators with public regulators because of concerns
77 Id.
78 Williams, 124 F3d at 422-23.
79 Id at 423.
80 590 F2d 1204 (DC Cir 1978) (per curiam).
81 Id at 1206-07.
82 Id at 1206.
8' Id at 1206-07.
Bergland, 590 F2d at 1207.
85 Id (applying rational basis review without explaining the standard).
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about corruption.as Under Section 107, private cost recovery plain-
tiffs suffer discrimination even though they are also engaged in a
quasi-regulatory role of cleaning up contaminated sites.
4. Summary of the personhood issue.
Case law does not clearly state whether private CERCLA
plaintiffs may raise an equal protection challenge to Section 107.
The only court to address the question directly, albeit in dicta,
noted that such a challenge is not permissible because not all of
the parties are "persons." On the other hand, several courts have
considered and rejected similar constitutional challenges without
requiring that all of the comparators had to be "persons.""' A pri-
vate party seeking to challenge Section 107 should emphasize
that (1) Congress intended to treat the government as a "person,"
(2) previous decisions such as Bergland analyzed similar claims
involving private and government parties, and (3) such a decision
would not open up the floodgates to equal protection challenges
because CERCLA presents a unique situation where both gov-
ernmental and private parties are acting similarly by cleaning up
land they did not contaminate and suing to recover the costs.
D. Private Cost Recovery Defendants May Raise the Equal
Protection Issue
If the federal government's "non-personhood" prevented pri-
vate cost recovery plaintiffs from challenging Section 107's ban on
attorneys' fees, private cost recovery defendants could raise the
issue instead. A private CERCLA defendant who is forced to pay
attorneys' fees to a governmental cost recovery plaintiff could ar-
gue that the statute, by authorizing governmental but not private
parties to recover attorneys' fees, arbitrarily discriminates among
identically situated private defendants. This argument has the
positive aspect of being a typical equal protection argument
against a law that discriminates against similarly situated par-
ties.
Unfortunately, such an argument has two significant prob-
lems. First, the result of a successful challenge by a CERCLA de-
fendant might be that neither governmental nor private parties
could recover their attorneys' fees, and this would have negative
86 See id at 1206-07.
87 See Part I C 2-3.
88 SeePartIC 1.
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policy consequences. Second, courts are not likely to accept this
argument, given that courts have summarily rejected other con-
stitutional challenges to CERCLA brought by defendants because
they do not want to undermine the statute's "polluter pays" prin-
ciple." Still, these challenges could be successful because there is
no rational basis for the disparity: Section 107 would allow two
identically situated private defendants to receive different out-
comes at trial merely because one was sued by a private party
and the other by a governmental party.' Finally, even if defen-
dants are not successful in challenging Section 107, private plain-
tiffs should argue that since defendants can make equal protec-
tion challenges to Section 107, they should be able to as well.
Since the best policy outcome is for both governmental and pri-
vate parties to recover their attorneys' fees, it would be unfortu-
nate if the only parties that could challenge Section 107 were pol-
luters, and not the companies that actually clean up another
party's waste.
II. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL COST RECOVERY PLAINTIFFS
ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER SECTION 107
Assuming that the question of defining the government as a
"person" does not bar a private plaintiff's equal protection chal-
lenge to Section 107, the plaintiff must next prove that it is simi-
larly situated with respect to governmental cost recovery plain-
tiffs.9' A private plaintiff does not have to show that private and
governmental cost recovery plaintiffs are identically situated in
Section 107 actions, only that they are sufficiently similarly situ-
ated to require that statutory discrimination not-be entirely arbi-
trary or irrational. 9' For example, the Supreme Court in Rinaldi vYeager 3 and Baxstrom v Herold' found that parties as dissimilar
89 See, for example, notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9o See Part IV.
9, See Heller v Doe, 509 US 312, 319-21 (1993) (rejecting a rational basis challenge to
a statute that distinguished between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded and find-
ing that the statute discriminated amongst dissimilar parties).
92 See Johnson v Daley, 117 F Supp 2d 889, 894-95 (W D Wis 2000) (holding that a
law awarding different attorneys' fees to prisoners and non-prisoners is unconstitutional)
(citations omitted).
93 384 US 305 (1966).
94 383 US 107 (1966).
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as prisoners and non-prisoners are still similarly situated for
equal protection purposes."
The government, as a sovereign, is never identically situated
to private actors, whether they are individuals or corporations."
Therefore, private cost recovery plaintiffs seeking to challenge
Section 107 on equal protection grounds will have to dispel the
preliminary assumption that governmental and private parties
are not similarly situated.
A. CERCLA Shows That the Parties Are Similarly Situated
CERCLA § 101 defines "person" as "an individual, firm, cor-
poration, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipal-
ity, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." 7 As the Supreme Court recognized in Pennsylvania v Un-
ion Gas Co,"9 Congress understood that the government would be
liable in all circumstances under CERCLA absent a specific
statutory authorization to the contrary." For example, in Section
101(20)(D), Congress excludes the government from liability for
property that it acquires involuntarily by virtue of its sovereign
functions, such as bankruptcy or tax delinquency." Section
101(20)(D)'s express exclusion of the government from liability for
sovereign functions shows that Congress's background under-
96 Rinaldi, 384 US at 308 (holding that it violates equal protection to require certain
indigent prisoners, but not nonprisoners, to reimburse counties for the costs of their tran-
scripts on appeal); Baxstrom, 383 US at 110 (holding that it violates equal protection to
deny allegedly mentally ill prisoners the same right to a de novo jury trial review of a civil
commitment decision that the state afforded nonprisoners). But see Allen v Cuomo, 100
F3d 253, 260-61 (2d Cir 1996) (holding that absence of a hardship waiver for surcharges
assessed against prisoners convicted of disciplinary infractions is consistent with equal
protection because prisoners and nonprisoners are not similarly situated).
See Carter v United States, 982 F2d 1141, 1144-45 (7th Cir 1992) (noting that "the
national government is never situated identically to private parties," but nevertheless
holding that the government may be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical
malpractice when a private citizen would be liable in similar circumstances).
97 42 USC § 9601(21).
98 491 US 1 (1989).
See id at 12, revd on other grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US
44, 64-65 (1995) (holding that the federal government cannot abrogate states' sovereign
immunity from suit under the Indian Commerce Clause). The problem Seminole Tribe
found in Union Gas was its Eleventh Amendment analysis, not its statutory analysis of
CERCLA. See id at 64-66. In fact, Justice Scalia, writing for three of the dissenting jus-
tices in Union Gas, explicitly accepted the majority's statutory analysis. See Union Gas,
491 US at 29 (Scalia dissenting).
100 See 42 USC § 9601(20)(D). See also Union Gas, 491 US at 11-12.
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standing was that governmental parties ought to be liable to the
same extent as private parties. 10
Not only did Congress intend the government to be liable for
its own pollution just as private parties were, it also intended the
government's cost recovery actions to be similar to those brought
by private parties. 2 After describing governmental cost recover-
ies, Section 107(a)(4)(B) describes private cost recoveries as those
done by "any other person," showing that Congress conceived of
governmental parties as "persons" similar to private parties for
the purpose of cost recovery actions and liability.
10 3
B. The Government is Not Uniquely Situated in Cost
Recovery Actions
One could argue that since the government is responsible for
developing and administering the National Contingency Plan
(NCP), it is not similarly situated to a private cost recovery plain-
tiff, who is merely a pawn in the grand statutory scheme.
CERCLA Section 105 orders the President to monitor a compre-
hensive "national contingency plan" for the removal of oil and
other hazardous substances that establishes "procedures and
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, and contaminants."0 4 The NCP includes, among many
other provisions, criteria for determining priorities of cleanups, 5
methods for discovering and investigating hazardous waste con-
tamination, ' and appropriate roles for federal, state, and local
governments in carrying out the plan's goals.' As the statute
delegates primary authority for ensuring the NCP's success to
governments, one could argue that this fact alone makes it im-
possible for the government to be similarly situated with respect
to private parties.
This argument, however, is only partially valid. This is true
for the CERCLA scheme overall, where the government is not
similarly situated with respect to private parties because it is in
'01 See Union Gas, 491 US at 11-12.
12 See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B).
103 See id. Of course, Section 107 shows that Congress did not intend for the law to
apply equally to governmental and private parties. Nevertheless, the statute as a whole
recognizes the similar nature of private and governmental cleanups. This similarity ought
to be enough to require that discriminatory treatment have a rational basis.
104 See 42 USC § 9605(a).
105 See 42 USC § 9605(a)(8).
'c' See 42 USC § 9605(a)(1).
101 See 42 USC § 9605(a)(4).
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charge of overseeing the entire system of site cleanups.1 8 With
respect to cost recovery actions under Section 107, though, the
government is situated similarly to private parties."° In fact, de-
spite the government's role in promulgating the NCP, Section 107
requires the government to comply with the NCP in order to re-
cover its costs from the responsible parties, as it does to private
parties."° Therefore, the argument that the NCP renders the gov-
ernment unique in cost recovery actions is inconsistent with the
statute's text.
In Section 107 cost recovery actions, both governmental and
private plaintiffs sue to recover their costs from the responsible
parties after cleaning up contaminated land-land that they are
often not responsible for contaminating. " Indeed, in United
States v Iron Mountain Mines,1 a district court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that CERCLA gives the government sover-
eign immunity from negligent cleanup suits, noting that govern-
mental cleanup and cost recovery actions are "not different in any
significant respect" from those of a private party.'8 Academic
commentators have also agreed with this assessment, and several
have used the similarity of governmental and private cost recov-
ery actions to argue that Section 107 unfairly discriminates
against private parties."'
Nor is the government uniquely situated in cost recovery ac-
tions because of its concern for the public interest. It is true that
the government bears responsibility for the National Contingency
See generally 42 USC § 9605 (describing government responsibility over CERCLA).
See 42 USC § 9607.
10 See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(A) (stating that CERCLA defendants are liable for costs
incurred by governments "not inconsistent with the national contingency plan").
"' See 42 USC § 9607. See also United States v Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F Supp
1432, 1445 (E D Cal 1995) (memorandum opinion).
1 881 F Supp 1432 (E D Cal 1995) (memorandum opinion).
113 Id at 1445. The government had argued that governmental bodies clean up the
pollution caused by third parties while private parties do not, but the court recognized
that since both governmental and private parties could bring a cost recovery suit, both
would clean up third party pollution. See id. See also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Andrew J.
Harrison, Jr., and Monica J. Palko, Cost Recovery By Private Parties Under CERCLA:
Planning a Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 Tulsa L J 365, 411 (1992) ( "Al-
though a private party cannot bring an enforcement action against another private party
under CERCLA as can the United States government, the private party can clean up the
site and then bring a cost recovery action. Functionally, the end result is the same; the
goals of CERCLA are accomplished by the cleanup and apportionment of the costs to the
responsible party.") (citations omitted).
114 See, for example, Dianne K. LeVerrier, Are Some Polluters More Equal Than Oth-
ers? A Critique of Caselaw Establishing Preferential Treatment of Federal Potentially
Responsible Parties Under CERCLA, 17 Touro L Rev 503, 522-23 (2001).
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Plan and thus is expected to ensure the overall success of the
cleanup system."' Furthermore, the government, unlike private
parties, theoretically cleans up sites not only to avoid liability,
but also because it seeks to promote the public good. Different
incentives, however, should not render governmental and private
cost recovery plaintiffs dissimilarly situated. In spite of their
"selfish" motives, private parties are in fact promoting the public
good by cleaning up contaminated sites, just as the government
does when it cleans up a site. In fact, the EPA relies on private
parties to conduct most CERCLA cleanups,'6 and thus private
parties should be seen as the government's partners in fulfilling
the NCP.
Finally, the question of whether governmental and private
cost recovery plaintiffs are similarly situated is largely inter-
twined with the question of whether Section 107 has a rational
basis for its discriminatory impact. The extent to which a court
will accept that governmental and private plaintiffs are similarly
situated in Section 107 actions turns in part on whether the court
considers the discrimination against private parties to be unrea-
sonable."'
III. COURTS WILL ANALYZE SECTION 107 USING RATIONAL
BASIS REVIEW
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from discriminating against particular individu-
als or classes."' Although the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause does not directly apply to federal legislation,
courts have ruled that federal laws are subject to equal protection
challenge through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause."9
"'. See 42 USC § 9605.
"6 See HR Rep No 103-582 at 76 (cited in note 4).
117 See Vasquez-Velezmoro v United States INS, 281 F3d 693, 697 (8th Cir 2002) ("[Pe-
titioner's] equal protection claim cannot succeed. The reason is that petitioner's situation
is not sufficiently similar to a person eligible for FFOA treatment to require equal treat-
ment. In other words, there is a rational basis for distinguishing between petitioner and
an alien who received FFOA relief.").
11 US Const Amend XIV.
"9 See Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that the requirement of
equal protection applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment). This
was not always the case. The Supreme Court initially did not view the equal protection
clause to apply to acts by Congress or other branches of the federal government. See, for
example, La Belle Iron Works v United States, 256 US 377, 392 (1921) (upholding a federal
law defining "invested capital" based on original rather than present value for tax deduc-
tion purposes, and rejecting any requirement that the law must comport with equal pro-
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A. Standards of Review in Equal Protection Challenges
When deciding which standard of review to apply to an equal
protection challenge, courts look at whether the discrimination
harms a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right. Courts
employ a strict scrutiny standard when the government uses a
suspect classification, such as race, national origin, or religion, in
order to discriminate among otherwise similarly situated par-
ties.'0 Courts also apply strict scrutiny when the government
burdens a fundamental right, by denying the right to vote or ac-
cess to the courts, for example, in discriminating among similarly
situated parties.12 In order to survive strict scrutiny, a law must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'2
The second standard courts use to analyze equal protection
challenges is intermediate scrutiny."n Courts apply the interme-
diate scrutiny standard when a statute employs a quasi-suspect
classification such as gender.24 Under intermediate scrutiny, the
government must show that the challenged classification serves
an important state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest.
12 5
The lowest level of scrutiny that courts employ in analyzing
equal protection challenges is rational basis review.2 1 Courts ap-
tection standards). However, the Court now views the Fifth Amendment as incorporating
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and applying it to the federal govern-
ment. See Boling, 347 US at 499-500. Despite the different constitutional sources for
equal protection challenges to state and federal actions, courts do not analyze Fifth
Amendment equal protection challenges differently than those brought under the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 638 n 2 (1975) (holding that
a provision of the Social Security Act granting survivor benefits to widows but not widow-
ers was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and noting that "[tihis Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment") (citations omitted).
,20 See Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 214, 227-29 (applying strict
scrutiny to a racial set-aside program).
.. See Moore u Detroit School Reform Board, 293 F3d 352, 370-71 (6th Cir 2002)
(declining to apply strict scrutiny because no fundamental right was violated by infringing
the plaintiffs ability to elect members of the Detroit school board).
'2 City of Richmond v J.A. Croson, 488 US 469, 491-93 (1989) (applying strict scru-
tiny to a racial set-aside program).
" Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 223-24 (1982) (noting that even though the legislation in
question did not burden a suspect class or a fundamental right, its disastrous effects on
undocumented children means that it should "hardly be considered rational unless it
furthers some substantial goal of the State").
124 Id.
12S Id.
126 See Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 452, 440 (1985) (holding, under
rational basis review, that zoning restrictions targeting the mentally retarded were un-
constitutional, even though the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class).
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ply rational basis review when a classification does not burden a
suspect class or a fundamental right.127 Discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual preference or economic status are examples of classi-
fications analyzed under the rational basis standard. 8 To survive
a rational basis challenge, the government need only show that
the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a le-
gitimate state interest.1
B. Courts Will Use Rational Basis Review for Section 107
Federal courts will use the rational basis standard to analyze
challenges to Section 107's discrimination against private cost
recovery plaintiffs. Section 107 burdens private party cost recov-
ery plaintiffs, who are not a suspect class, and instead favors gov-
ernmental cost recovery plaintiffs. 1" In addition, Section 107's
discrimination against private parties does not burden a funda-
mental right, such as the right to vote or to migrate freely be-
tween states. The statute merely makes it more difficult for pri-
vate parties to recover their costs after cleaning up a hazardous
waste site that they did not contaminate. 1 Therefore, the statute
does not trigger a strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny review,
and courts will analyze it under the more deferential rational ba-
sis standard.
1 2
C. How Courts Apply Rational Basis Review
The rational basis test calls for strong judicial deference to
legislative judgment. In Heller v Doe," the Supreme Court articu-
lated this view of the rational basis test, noting that:
[RIational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not
a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of legislative choices. .... Nor does it authorize the judici-
ary to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or de-
sirability of legislative policy determinations.... [T]he
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4).
1 See id.
132 See notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
133 509 US 312 (1993).
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burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement
to negate every conceivable basis which might support it.'"
The Heller Court's view of rational basis is extremely deferential,
and critics have classified it as an abdication of the Court's re-
sponsibility to review unfairly discriminatory statutes. '3 As ap-
plied to Section 107, this view of rational basis would allow a
court to uphold the classification through an ad'hoc justification,
even though Congress expressed no support for the court's justifi-
cation.'6 Furthermore, the Heller Court's view of the rational ba-
sis test does not appear to involve any balancing of competing
interests. Under Heller, a court will only consider whether there
is any conceivable rational basis for the statute, not whether the
alleged rational bases outweigh the interests of the class that the
statute discriminates against.1
7
At times, however, the Court has employed a version of the
rational basis test that is less deferential than that applied in
Heller.'38 In certain cases when a disadvantaged group is particu-
larly sympathetic and the interests of the party discriminated
against are strong, courts apply the rational basis test in a less
categorical fashion, balancing the competing interests involved."9
For example, in Romer v Evans,"O a case decided after Heller, the
Court used the rational basis test to strike down a Colorado con-
stitutional amendment that harmed the ability of gay rights ac-
tivists to lobby for legislation that would protect homosexuals."'
In Romer, the Court did more than try to find any conceivable
state interest that justified the statute; it also employed a balanc-
ing test that weighed the state's asserted interests with the
strong individual interests at stake if the discriminatory law
were to be upheld.'
13 Id at 319-20 (citations omitted).
,31 See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurispru-
dence of Economic Rights, 73 NC L Rev 329, 424-25 (1995) (arguing that courts should
more carefully scrutinize the purposes behind governmental actions).
1' See Heller, 509 US at 319-20.
'31 See id.
'8 See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).
... See id at 631.
40 517 US 620 (1996).
'4' Id at 631.
See id at 632-33 (balancing a homosexual person's right to lobby for protection
against discrimination with the state's asserted interests in allowing citizens freedom of
association and in conserving state resources to fight other kinds of discrimination).
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A court reviewing an equal protection challenge to Section
107 might use either Heller's deferential categorical approach or
Romer's balancing test. A private cost recovery plaintiff challeng-
ing Section 107's classifications should heed Heller's requirement
that it negate every "conceivable basis" for the statute." The chal-
lenging party should also emphasize that its interests outweigh
possible bases for Section 107's classification, as the challengers
in Romer did.1" In the context of Section 107, a private plaintiff
should argue that the current discriminatory scheme punishes
private parties for engaging in cleanups that further the public
good, and discourages private parties from undertaking massive
cleanup efforts."5 An equal protection challenge to Section 107
should both undermine all possible rationales for the statute's
discrimination and make the court sympathize with the situation
of private cost recovery plaintiffs.
IV. SECTION 107 VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION BY
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
A. Section 107 Bars Private Plaintiffs From Recovering
Attorneys' Fees
Under Section 107, governmental entities bringing cost re-
covery actions may recover "all costs" of recovery.'" In contrast,
private parties must prove that their costs were "necessary" and
may only recover the cleanup costs that the statute permits.'" In
1994, the Supreme Court ruled in Key Tronic v United States'"
that Section 107's language limiting private plaintiffs to "neces-
sary costs" bars them from recovering attorneys' fees associated
with cleanup. "' This bar applies only to private plaintiffs; after
Key Tronic, several lower courts ruled that the government may
still recover its attorneys' fees when it brings a cost recovery ac-
tion under Section 107.50 Key Tronic focused solely on the statu-
tory interpretation of Section 107, and did not discuss the policy
implications of its decision.'5 ' Thus, Key Tronic only stands for the
... See Heller, 509 US at 320.
144 See Romer, 517 US at 631.
145 See Rossman, Case Note, 4 Geo Mason U L Rev at 132 (cited in note 23).
" See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(A).
'17 See id.
148 511 US 809 (1994).
141 Id at 820-21.
,0 See, for example, United States v Chapman, 146 F3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir 1998).
"' See Key Tronic, 511 US at 811-12.
0
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proposition that Section 107 discriminates between private and
governmental parties in awarding attorneys' fees, not that the
statute has a rational basis for discriminating."
B. Analogous Equal Protection Cases: Challenges to the PLRA
Recent litigation challenging caps on the attorneys' fees un-
der the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides an equal
protection challenge analogous to Section 107's ban on private
party attorneys' fees. '" The PLRA restricts the amount of attor-
neys' fees prisoners can recover when they prevail in constitu-
tional claims against the government."' Prisoners have argued
that the PLRA violates equal protection because they are only
entitled to limited attorneys' fees while non-prisoners who prevail
in suits against the government for constitutional violations are
allowed to fully recover attorneys' fees.155 The PLRA cases are ap-
propriate analogies to Section 107's attorneys' fees ban because
courts analyze equal protection challenges to the PLRA under a
rational basis test'50 as they would a challenge to Section 107 .
Additionally, both the PLRA and Section 107 seek to protect the
government by discriminating against classes of plaintiffs in the
awarding of attorneys' fees.' Federal courts currently split over
whether the PLRA's cap on attorneys' fees violates equal protec-
tion principles. 9
1. Split decisions on the PLRA.
In Johnson v Daley,"® a federal district court in Wisconsin
found that the PLRA's cap on attorneys' fees violated equal pro-
tection principles by discriminating between prisoners and non-
152 See id.
153 See Johnson v Daley, 117 F Supp 2d 889, 903 (W D Wis 2000) (ruling that the
PLRA is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
15 42 USC § 1997e(d)(2)-(3) (capping attorneys fees at 150 percent of the judgment or
150 percent of the hourly rate of court appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act).
1 5 See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 893.
156 See id at 894.
157 See Part II.
1' See Johnson, 117 F Supp at 900-01 (discussing the PLRA's aim of protecting the
public fisc). See also 42 USC § 9607 (giving preferential treatment to governmental cost
recovery actions).
169 Compare Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 903 (holding that the PLRA is unconstitu-
tional), with Madrid v Gomez, 190 F3d 990, 996 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that the PLRA is
constitutional).
160 117 F Supp 2d 889.
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prisoners who sue the government. ' The court rejected the ar-
gument that the cap on attorneys' fees was necessary to deter
frivolous suits by prisoners who, it argued, were more likely to
file such claims.'6' The Johnson court reasoned that frivolous suits
are often dismissed early in litigation and that the possibility of
attorneys' fees will not affect prisoners' decisions." In addition,
the court rejected the argument that the cap was necessary to
protect the public fisc, noting that non-prisoners are not subject
to the cap and that a desire to protect the public fisc does not jus-
tify arbitrary discrimination."
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, split evenly on the ques-
tion,'6' and the First," Sixth, 61 and Ninth Circuits" found no
equal protection violation. In the Ninth Circuit case, Madrid v
Gomez,'69 the court commented on Congress's stated goal of reduc-
ing frivolous lawsuits in enacting the PLRA, noting that this also
minimizes costs to taxpayers. ' The court determined that even
though the statute achieved its goal by singling out prisoners,
Congress could reasonably assume that prisoners filed a dispro-
portionate number of frivolous claims because of their small op-
161 Id at 893.
162 See id at 895-900.
'6 See id at 895-96.
'6 See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 900-01 (noting that it is unfair to single out a group
of people to achieve even a legitimate goal such as protecting the public fisc). See also
Robbins v Chronister, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 3835, *22-23 n 5 (D KS) (holding that the
PLRA's fee cap does not apply to a prisoner challenging a constitutional violation that
occurred when the plaintiff was not a prisoner). The Robbins court noted that none of the
possible justifications for the PLRA's fee limitations are rational when applied to claims
that arose before the plaintiff was incarcerated. Id at 22-23. Furthermore, the court noted
that it had "grave concerns" regarding the constitutionality of applying the fee limitations
in this case, and that the only governmental interest that would be advanced by doing so,
protecting the public fisc, must not unjustifiably burden one group. Id at 23. This reason-
ing is even more apt for Section 107's discrimination, which discriminates against a par-
ticular group in the award of attorneys' fees without any rational basis, not even the pro-
tection of the public fisc.
165 See Collins v Montgomery County Board of Prison Inspectors, 176 F3d 679, 686 (3d
Cir 1999) (en banc) (also noting that in this particular case, invalidating the fee cap would
not alter the plaintiff's award), cert denied, 528 US 1115 (2000). Under Third Circuit
jurisprudence, such divided en banc decisions are entitled to no precedential weight. See
Tunis Brothers Co, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 763 F2d 1482, 1501 (3d Cir 1985) (rejecting pre-
cedential value of two specific earlier cases because they were affirmed by equally divided
en banc courts), vacd on other grounds, 475 US 1105 (1986).
'66 Boivin v Black, 225 F3d 36, 43-46 (1st Cir 2000) (finding a rational relationship
between the fee cap and legitimate governmental purposes).
," Hadix v Johnson, 230 F3d 840, 847 (6th Cir 2000) (finding a rational relationship
between the fee cap and the government's desire to reduce frivolous lawsuits).
'6 Madrid v Gomez, 190 F3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir 1999) (same).
169 190 F3d 990 (9th Cir 1999).
170 Id at 996.
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portunity costs and large potential gains. 7' Throughout its opin-
ion, the Madrid court referred to the legislative history of the
PLRA, which showed Congress's strong desire to curb prisoner
litigation and explained the rationale for the attorneys' fee cap.17 2
2. Using the PLRA cases to challenge Section 107.
As an example of a Fifth Amendment equal protection chal-
lenge to a substantively discriminatory statute, the PLRA cases
are helpful to a Section 107 challenge. In using these cases to
challenge Section 107, a plaintiff should explain why the cases,
such as Johnson, that found equal protection violations were cor-
rectly decided. After doing so, the plaintiff should explore the
analogy between the PLRA and Section 107's substantive dis-
crimination against private cost recovery plaintiffs, emphasizing
that both discriminate by limiting the attorneys' fees a particular
class of plaintiffs may recover." Finally, the plaintiff should use
the particular rational basis arguments presented and rejected in
cases like Johnson to show why similar attempts to find a ra-
tional basis for Section 107 ought to fail. The plaintiff should also
explain how cases holding that the PLRA possessed a rational
basis are distinguishable in the Section 107 context.
a) Johnson was correctly decided. The district court in
Johnson correctly held that the PLRA's restrictions on prisoners'
ability to recover attorneys' fees arbitrarily discriminated against
prisoners.' A desire to protect the public fisc does not excuse the
government from the requirement of an independent basis for
statutory discrimination. " ' The Johnson court forced the govern-
ment to explain why the PLRA capped prisoners' attorneys' fees
to reduce the government's liability. The government's argument,
that prisoners file a disproportionate number of frivolous law-
suits, is unsound. Johnson correctly reasoned that the possibility
of recovering reduced attorneys' fees at some point in the future
was unlikely to sway prisoners' decisions, and that courts already
dismiss frivolous lawsuits early in litigation.'76 Therefore, Johnson
171 See id.
172 See id at 995-98.
173 See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 903; 42 USC § 9607(a)(4).
174 See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 902-03.
171 See id at 900-01.
176 See id at 896-900.
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correctly held there was no reason for a statute to single out pris-
177
oners for fee caps.
Lynn Branham, an academic commentator, recently pub-
lished a persuasive criticism of the PLRA's attorneys' fee cap,
specifically refuting the argument that prisoners file a dispropor-
tionate number of lawsuits. '78 First, Branham disputes the claim
that, absent fee caps, prisoners are more likely to file frivolous
lawsuits. "' Branham notes that Rule 11 sanctions are applicable
to those who file fraudulent or extremely frivolous claims, and
these already effectively deter frivolous suits. Branham's analy-
sis supports Johnson's holding and establishes a very strong cri-
tique of the proposed rational basis for the PLRA's discrimina-
tion.
b) Making the analogy between the PLRA and Sec-
tion 107. Whereas Congress designed the PLRA's cap on prison-
ers' attorneys' fees to protect the public fisc, its ban on private
parties attorneys' fees under Section 107 only protects the fi-
nances of polluters. Thus, the main justification for the PLRA,
that it protects the public fisc from expensive frivolous lawsuits,
does not apply to Section 107.'8' Therefore, there is a better argu-
ment for invalidating Section 107's discrimination rather than
the PLRA's, as doing so would only hurt polluters, not the gov-
ernment.
Nevertheless, several aspects of the PLRA do provide helpful
analogies to Section 107. For one, both the PLRA and Section 107
address caps on attorneys' fees. In fact, Section 107, which cate-
gorically prohibits private cost recovery plaintiffs from recovering
any attorneys' fees, is much harsher than the PLRA, which
merely limits the amount of attorneys' fees prisoners can re-
cover.82 Furthermore, the PLRA cases address whether distinc-
tions among plaintiffs can be justified by a desire to give the gov-
17' Id at 900.
"8 See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions on Attorneys' Fees, 89 Cal L Rev
999, 1022-23 (2001).
179 See id at 1023-24.
'8 See id (explaining that attorneys, not wanting to receive Rule 11 sanctions, will not
bring frivolous lawsuits on behalf of inmates).
'8' See Madrid, 190 F3d at 996.
182 See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 905 (finding that attorneys' fee award following a
jury award of forty thousand dollars in damages should be 200 percent, not 150 percent, of
the judgment). See also 42 USC § 1997e(d)(2)-(3).
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ernment special treatment.' Johnson's reasoning that arbitrary
attorneys' fee caps are unconstitutional even if they do benefit the
government provides support for a challenge to the ban on pri-
vate party attorneys' fees in Section 107.8'
Another important way one can use the PLRA cases to chal-
lenge Section 107 is to establish that governmental and private
parties are similarly situated in cost recovery actions. The PLRA
cases provide support for a finding that statutory discrimination
among non-identically situated parties violates equal protection."
As noted above, one might claim that Section 107 does not dis-
criminate among similarly situated parties, since governmental
and private plaintiffs are not identical."' However, the PLRA
cases show that even when a statute discriminates among parties
as dissimilar as prisoners and non-prisoners, it still needs a ra-
tional basis.8 7 The analogy is particularly apt because in both the
PLRA and the Section 107 contexts, the arguably dissimilar par-
ties are engaged in the same activity: bringing suit in federal
court.81
8
c) The Madrid court's concern about frivolous litigation
does not apply to Section 107. Another important distinction be-
tween the PLRA and Section 107 is that unlike prisoners, private
parties do not incur low opportunity costs in filing frivolous
claims for cost recovery. 8' The Madrid court accepted Congress's
position that prisoners file an excessive number of frivolous law-
suits because they have little else to do and they are willing to
spend the time in order to reap potentially large rewards." In
contrast, hazardous site cleanup and subsequent cost recovery
actions cannot be considered low cost to a private party, as the
cost of these activities average thirty million dollars."' A private
party is not likely to risk so much money, most of which they
would have to pay before they could even bring a cost recovery
action, on a frivolous claim.
See Johnson, 117 F Supp 2d at 900-01.
"' See id.
" See id at 902-03.
"' See Part II.
"87 See Madrid, 190 F3d at 996 ("[We simply ask whether there is a rational basis for
the classification.").
18 See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4).
19 See note 25.
See Madrid, 190 F3d at 996.
"' See note 25.
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One could still argue that the rational basis for Section 107's
substantive discrimination is that, in reducing the incentives of
private parties to litigate, it encourages them to settle. This ar-
gument was advanced in an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme
Court in Key Tronic."' The brief argued that awarding attorneys'
fees promotes endless litigation by allowing private cost recovery
plaintiffs to litigate for free.193 This argument seems reasonable,
but for a variety of reasons it fails to provide a rational basis for
discrimination in Section 107.
The first problem with this contention is that the rational
basis argument is only complete after it explains why the concern
over settlement incentives does not also apply to the government.
If Congress sought to encourage CERCLA settlements, why did it
not apply Section 107's ban on attorneys' fees to both governmen-
tal and private plaintiffs? The prospect of recovering attorneys'
fees might also encourage governmental parties to pursue litiga-
tion instead of settlement. In addition, as discussed above with
respect to Section 107's procedural discrimination, governmental
agencies are often subject to political pressure."' The government
may face strong pressure to litigate instead of settle, to show that
it does not tolerate polluters. The prospect of recovering attor-
neys' fees only further skews these incentives. In sum, there are
many reasons to believe that, if the desire to encourage settle-
ment is a rational basis for Section 107's substantive discrimina-
tion against private plaintiffs, the ban on fee recovery should also
apply to the government.
The second problem with the possibility that Section 107 en-
courages private parties to settle is that, in fact, allowing parties
to recover attorneys' fees may encourage the responsible parties
to settle.99 Even if one accepts that the government does not need
a cap on attorneys' fees to encourage it to settle, for Section 107 to
have a rational basis, the ban on private plaintiffs attorneys' fees
112 Brief of the Sand Springs Superfund PRP Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Key Tronic v United States, No 93-376 (filed Feb 28, 1994) (available on
Lexis at 1993 US Briefs 376).
193 See id.
194 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt
Sci 3, 3-21 (1971) (noting that regulators often issue regulations favoring certain interest
groups that have something to offer in return).
1"' See Rossman, Case Note, 4 Geo Mason U L Rev at 132 (cited in note 23), citing
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 428-29 (1973) (observing that awarding attorneys' fees increases
the costs for a party mistakenly expecting success in litigation, thereby raising the rate of
settlements).
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must be effective in encouraging settlement. Instead, all that Sec-
tion 107's cap on attorneys' fees accomplishes is an increase in
the bargaining power of the responsible defendants in settlement
negotiations.'
Given that so many contaminated sites have yet to be
cleaned up, and that private parties routinely spend staggering
amounts on CERCLA cleanups, the current regime has not suc-
ceeded in encouraging private parties to clean up contaminated
land and settle with the responsible parties.197 The possibility that
Section 107 may encourage some private parties to settle must be
weighed against the stated goals of the statute.'" The statute's
ban on private party attorneys' fees compromises these goals. As
the Supreme Court noted in Union Gas, in enacting CERCLA
Congress sought to encourage private cleanups by allowing pri-
vate parties to recover their costs from the responsible parties.'"
Despite Congress's intent to encourage private cleanups,
CERCLA § 107 undermines this goal, and in doing so, violates
equal protection.
C. Refuting The Claim That Private Parties Might Inflate Costs
One aspect of Section 107's discrimination that the PLRA
cases do not address is the possibility that private cost recovery
plaintiffs may be tempted to inflate attorneys' fees. While Con-
gress did not explicitly state this as a rationale for the disparity
in recoverable costs, it is possible that the statute does serve this
goal." If private parties know that their fees are not recoverable,
they have an incentive to keep their costs reasonable.
Simply stating that private parties may inflate costs without
Section 107's restrictions is not enough. To convince a court to
uphold Section 107, the government must also show why a pri-
vate party is more likely to inflate fees than the EPA or other
government agency acting in a remedial capacity."1 Otherwise,
' See Rossman, Case Note, 4 Geo Mason L Rev at 133 (cited in note 23).
197 See notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
198 See notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
1 See Union Gas, 491 US at 21-22.
20 See Heller, 509 US at 319-20 (noting that Congress does not have to express a
particular rationale in order for a court to use it as a rational basis).
201 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 448-50 (1985) (holding
that a municipal zoning regulation that excludes a group home for the retarded cannot be
upheld against an equal protection challenge because the city cannot explain why it gives
beneficial treatment given to other permitted uses).
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the government has not proven that the statute has a rational
basis for discriminating against private parties."
While one could argue that the government would not inflate
costs as much as a private party, this argument is very weak. For
one, the argument is contradicted by data showing that private
parties perform cleanups quicker and at lower cost than the
EPA. °3 As one scholar has noted, the EPA is extremely wasteful
in hiring contractors to perform cleanups:
In 1988, the EPA agreed to establish semi-permanent of-
fices for forty-five companies that would plan and super-
vise cleanups. The EPA has been paying salaries, rent and
other business costs-such as recruitment and training
costs and employee bonuses-without regard to the num-
ber of cleanup jobs the companies have been managing. It
even paid the contractors start-up money before they had
any projects to manage. Four firms on the West Coast re-
ceived $855,000 for half of 1989 without visiting even one
toxic waste site. In some cases, the EPA has paid twice as
much for a firm to administer a cleanup site as it actually
cost the firm to clean it up .... 2"4
The contrast between private party efficiency and governmental
waste makes sense in the context of CERCLA cleanups. Private
parties have very little, if any, profit to gain by inflating costs,
since a cost recovery plaintiff proceeding under Section 107 is
only entitled to recover "necessary" expenses.20'
CONCLUSION
CERCLA's discrimination against private party cost recovery
actions is inequitable and unwise. Section 107 encourages private
parties who own contaminated land not to clean it up, since they
will never recover their attorneys' fees. Section 107's discrimina-
tion against private parties only protects polluters; it does not
202 See id.
203 See Roseann Oliver, The Intersection of CERCLA and RCRA: What Companies
Should Know, 42 Fed'n of Ins & Corp Couns Q 445, 449-50 (1992).
204 Robert W. McGee, Should Superfund Be Wasted? The Case to Trash the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 11 Glendale L
Rev 120, 122, 125 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
20' See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B) (limiting private cost recovery actions to "necessary"
costs).
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protect the environment or any other conceivable public policy
goals.
Therefore, private plaintiffs should challenge Section 107 on
the grounds that it violates equal protection. No court has ever
invalidated, on equal protection grounds, a statute that discrimi-
nates between governmental and private plaintiffs. Section 107,
however, is uniquely suited for equal protection analysis because
governmental and private plaintiffs are similarly situated in
CERCLA cost recovery actions. Furthermore, Section 107's denial
of private attorneys' fees is so irrational-much more so than the
PLRA's controversial limit on prisoner fee awards -that it is un-
constitutional. Twenty years after Congress passed CERCLA, the
statute has still failed to encourage private cleanup. Eliminating
the disparity between private and governmental cost recoveries
will breathe new life into an ineffective statute.
